A Battlefield Too Even
MG (Ret.) Robert H. Scales Jr.
American Legion Magazine
December, 2006
Watch the news on virtually any evening and you will realize that
America is engaged in a death struggle against Islamic insurgents who
have chosen to fight us on the ground. We would certainly prefer to
engage him with technology.
Watch the news on virtually any evening and you will realize that
America is engaged in a death struggle against Islamic insurgents who
have chosen to fight us on the ground. We would certainly prefer to
engage him with technology. To some extent the military does leverage
the overwhelming killing power of air, sea and space systems to give
some advantage to soldiers and marines. But the news clips don’t lie.
They tell us that the overwhelming burden for winning the “Long War’
rests on the shoulders of some very young private guarding a checkpoint
in Fallujah or walking point in some very bad neighborhood in Baghdad.
Almost four out of five dead suffered at the hands of the enemy since
World War II have been light infantry, foot soldiers, a force that
comprises less than four percent of our military. Today actions of the
enemy have placed the burden for victory or defeat on to small light
infantry units, principally squads of about ten to twelve.
Unfortunately it is here where most of the fighting still occurs in
places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Haven’t Israeli losses in
places like Bint Jbeil (or Marine losses in Fallujah) shown that it’s
too expensive in soldier’s lives to confront the enemy on the ground at
the small unit level? Haven’t we learned in places like Korea and
Vietnam that tactical close fighting on the ground is exactly what the
enemy wants? Maybe. But recent experience seems to have resurrected
once again the concern that perhaps we haven’t tried, really tried, to
find ways and means to engage an insurgent on the ground at the small
unit level without suffering excessive casualties.
To be fair we have done much to improve the fighting abilities of light
infantry. Without question body armor has saved thousands of lives.
Night vision goggles give our dismounted soldiers an enormous advantage
when fighting at night. In spite of these technological advantages all
too often these battles are “fair fights.” What the enemy forfeits in
technology he makes up with knowledge of the terrain, superior
intelligence, support from a friendly populace and often a willingness
to die. The bottom line as simple as it is startling: except for better
training, morale and leadership, American light infantry go into battle
today with a cumulative advantage not much better than their
grandfathers had in Korea and Vietnam.
If we are to win the long war against radical Islamism we must make our
light infantry units more survivable and more effective in the close
fight. During the past half century we have invested pennies on the
defense dollar on our infantry. There are many areas that desperately
need attention if we are to commit to keeping light infantry alive in
battle. Just a few:
Weapons
The soldier shortcomings that have recently drawn the most media
attention are the lifesaving, "defensive" items -- armored HMMWVs,
counter mine devices, and body armor. But to an infantryman, or any
other soldier under fire, his ability to save his own life and those of
his colleagues begins (and often ends) with his rifle. The enemy’s
rifle is as good as ours. The M-16 rifle first appeared in 1957. It was
a marginally effective weapon then and its successor, the M-4, is not
much better today. The weapon’s most serious deficiency is its tendency
to misfire when dirty or fouled. Our soldiers have learned that their
weapons need constantly cleaning particularly on windy days when the
desert talcum powder sand is most likely to collect in the chamber and
jam the weapon. By contrast the venerable Soviet AK 47 and its many
variants used by the enemy can be fired even after being buried in the
ground for days.
For almost six years the Army has been looking closely at a new weapon,
the M-8 family of 5.56 mm rifles and machine guns. The M-8 uses a
completely different operating system much like the AK and thus is far
more reliable. The M-8 is a true family in that a single basic
configuration can be modified to become a standard assault rifle
suitable for use by most members of the squad. Modified to fire belt
ammunition it becomes a light machine gun. Fitted with a special barrel
and it’s a sniper rifle and shortened with a folding stock and short
barrel and it becomes a carbine suitable for use by specialized troops
such as cavalry, artillery and aviation.
The Army’s XM-307 grenade launcher is the first true technological
breakthrough in battlefield small arms in almost three generations. The
technology is in the bullet, a small 25 mm grenade that contains micro
circuitry to receive data from a laser rangefinder mounted on the
barrel of the weapon. The shooter aims the laser at a target and
programs the grenade to detonate directly over the target. The 25 mm
round is extraordinarily accurate. In recent tests at Aberdeen Proving
Ground in Maryland firers were able to detonate the round just inside a
meter square target at over 500 meters. If light infantry soldiers had
the XM-307 in Iraq they would be able to kill enemy hidden in buildings
and behind walls… a capability sorely needed in the back alley fights
that have caused so many casualties.
Sadly, neither the M-8 nor the XM-307 will likely ever be in the hands
of our soldiers in Iraq even though both have been tested and proven
since before 9-11. Both were cut from the budget because of a lack of
funding. Our soldiers will have to soldier on with a weapon system that
their grandfathers found to be defective almost half a century ago. The
entire Army and Marine Corps could be fully equipped with the M-8 for
the cost of three F-22s, the Air Force’s latest fighter plane.
Touch
Fear grips every soldier’s heart as he closes on the enemy. Once
bullets start whacking over his head he pulled by two opposing
psychological forces. One is fear of violent death and the prospect of
dying alone. Psychologists call this phenomenon “palliation.” The other
is the imperative to follow orders and not let his buddies down. A
soldier chooses the latter when he has confidence in his leaders and
when he is in touch with those around him. Touch is particularly tough
to maintain in the urban terrain of Iraq and Afghanistan. Buddies
within the squad often lose visual contact in back alleys and inside
urban dwellings. Today squad leaders have radios for maintaining
contact with their leaders but individual soldiers (just like their
grandfathers in past wars) must rely on eye contact, hand and arm
signals and shouted commands to maintain touch.
Radios are cheap. Virtually every cop on the beat has a hand held
”brick” radio to keep in touch with his partner. Soldiers should be
similarly equipped. As a minimum every member of a squad should possess
a communications device sophisticated enough to allow every soldier to
remain connected to every other soldier in his squad. If possible the
device should provide data as well as voice. Likewise small unit
leaders at squad level in particularly should be able to “see” their
soldiers in some virtual sense. Individual monitors attached to every
soldier might be used to keep a leader informed of the exact position
of his soldiers. If this device contained some component yielding
biofeedback information a leader would also be able to tell the
physical and emotional condition of his soldiers. These “combat
polygraphs” would help a leader decide which of his soldiers was best
prepared emotionally to perform a specific combat task. Collective data
would tell higher commanders when a small unit has reached its
emotional, physical and psychological point of exhaustion.
Protection
Individual soldier protection is a good news story in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Virtually all deaths in close combat occur when soldiers
are struck in the head and torso. The newest version of the soldier’s
helmet can stop most explosive fragmentation and has been demonstrated
to deflect many small arms rounds. Torso armor in the form of the
ballistic vest can also stop, deflect or, if hit directly in the chest
stop even rifle rounds. The problem with soldier protection today is
weight and bulk. Soldiers complain that in the summer heat of Iraq the
vest is almost unbearably hot. Dismounted soldiers can only carry so
much and in the heat of a small arms fight weight that slows a soldier
down takes away one of his most important advantages.
There is a solution to the problem of the soldier’s load in the close
fight. Technology exists today to equip light infantry with an
“exoskeleton,” essentially a robotic suit powered by a small gas engine
that a soldier can strap on his arms and legs. Computers and
sophisticated hydraulics senses and amplifies muscular movements in his
arms and legs. Imagine a small arms fight in which one soldier in each
squad fights using an exoskeleton. He body is fully surrounded with
bullet proof ceramic armor. Even with a 50 pound XM-29 attached to his
chest he can maneuver at full speed. No enemy would stand a chance
against a robotic soldier. Exotic as it may sound we could have robotic
soldiers in the field soon…if we were willing to pay for it.
Pay the price for high performing small units
Greater attention must be given to the selection, bonding and
psychological and physical preparation that close combat soldiers if
they are to perform well in the dangerous, unfamiliar and horrifically
desolate terrain and weather in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.
Modern science offers some promising solutions. Today soldiers can be
better tuned psychologically to endure the stresses of close combat.
The biological sciences offer promise that older, more mature soldiers
will be able to endure the physical stresses of close combat for longer
periods. This is important because experience strongly supports the
conclusion that older men make better close combat soldiers. Soldiers
in their late twenties and early thirties are more stable in crisis
situations, are less likely to be killed or wounded and are far more
effective in performing the essential tasks than teenagers. Only when
the bullets start to fly does the nation wake up to the fact that it
has too few ground soldiers. Pressure is mounting again to rush newly
recruited soldiers into combat. But this war has re-taught the age old
lesson that close combat Soldiers and Marines need time to develop to
peak fighting efficiency. Like a good wine years not months are
required to produce a close combat soldier. At least a year together is
necessary for an infantry squad to develop the collective skills
necessary to fight as a team. Think of an infantry squad as you might a
professional football team. On the field they are about the same size,
about 11 men. We all know that skill at blocking and tackling are not
enough to win the Super Bowl. A pro player must undergo a scientific
regimen of physical conditioning to win the big one. He does “two a
days” during Summer Camp and watches the films and studies the coach’s
plays intently at night. He always has to fight for his position on the
team because there is always the eager and hungry rookie looking to
take his spot on the starting roster. The quarterback knows that he can
not perform unless he has a team that follows his lead. A lack of
confidence in the team leads to disaster. A collection of pros playing
as individuals rather than a team will always lose.
We must build and equip our future close combat soldiers as if they
were very expensive and irreplaceable professional athletes. We have
fewer Army and Marine squads costing somewhere between nine and a
hundred thousand dollars apiece than we have first line fighter
aircraft, each purchased at a price somewhere between thirty and four
hundred million. We have yet to lose a fighter plane in this war. We
have lost almost three thousand soldiers and marines. Every general
manager of an NFL team knows that winners are purchased at a premium.
Those who are willing (and likely) to die for our country should be
held to no lesser standard and those who pay for having such men on the
roster should be willing to pay for the privileged of their presence.
Robert H. Scales, PhD, is president of Colgen, Inc., a consulting firm
specializing in issues relating to landpower, war-gaming and strategic
leadership. He is a retired Army major general and earned a silver star
in Vietnam. Besides serving as a senior military analyst for the BBC,
National Public Radio and Fox News, Scales is author of “Firepower in
Limited War” and “Certain Victory,” the official account of the Army in
the Gulf War.
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